Most political analysts failed to predict that the only policy "crises" are able to attract sufficient election of 1980 would be close; few foresaw the attention for resolution. landslide that would bring major changes in the policy-making machinery. The results surprised Emerging Food and Agricultural Policy Crises almost everyone. Ronald Reagan carried all but 6 states, and the Republicans won the Senate for Many farm-sector advocates believe strongly the first time in a quarter century. The balance of that the case for government price and income power in the House of Representatives also protection is stronger than ever. In their view, shifted toward the conservatives-Republicans the infrequent high prices during the 1970s have gained 33 seats. been more than offset by inflation in input prices, Whether these dramatic changes portend particularly for energy. They contend that govmajor changes in food and agricultural policy is ernment farm programs actually protect consumstill a question. An indication should come soon.
ers from themselves by trading off slightly higher The policy framework for agriculture, the Food prices now for more stable, perhaps lower, prices and Agriculture Act of 1977, as amended, expires in the future. They also believe that most nonin 1981. The converging forces that could lead to farmers are ignorant of the benefits of the farm modifications in that framework are the subject programs and that all proposals for change from of this paper. ' outside traditional agriculture are subterfuge. These perceptions are quite real. They are powerful. They have deep-seated roots and are THE FOOD POLICY ENVIRONMENT perpetuated with bits and pieces of fact. Such
FOR THE 1980s
perceptions will continue to carry a great deal of weight during the 1981 farm bill debate-and, unThe notion that "new" farm legislation will fortunately, in farm policy debates for some time "replace" the 1977 Act can be dismissed. Conto come. gressional and executive branch efforts simulBut economic pressures reflect reality, not taneously to reduce the role of government, cut perceptions. And the facts overwhelmingly suptaxes, and balance the budget will leave little port a conclusion that commercial agriculture time for protracted floor debates on other issues. fared quite well during the 1970s (Penn) . There That does not mean there will not be a 1981 are strong indications that the economic position farm bill. There will be; it probably will be a of farmers will continue to improve relative to 4-year bill. It does mean that food and agriculthe population as a whole during the 1980s. tural programs will not receive comprehensive
The chronic excess capacity problem that examination in 1981 unless doing so contributes characterized the sector for a quarter of a cento the solution of broader national problems.
tury following World War II has largely given With few exceptions, subsequently discussed, way to pressures for sustained increases in trend the bill should extend the policy framework emoutput. Domestic farmers and food consumers bodied in the 1977 act and its subsequent are now strongly influenced by the close and amendments.
growing interdependence of agriculture and This prediction is based on two factors. First, worldwide economic events. Broad national the changes in people-the policy-making mapolicies now focus on agriculture for continued chinery-will tend to slow the legislative proincreases in exports, help in producing energy cess, at least for a time. Second, and perhaps from renewable resources, and, simultaneously, most important, is the changing policy-making stability in food prices. The growing importance process. As the nation's problems have become of agriculture will give rise to spirited policy demore complex, so has the process for resolving bates in these three areas during the next several them. Debates are frequently so protracted that years.
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Expanding exports. Exports of U.S. farm FIGURE 1. Prices Received by Farmers, U.S. products increased dramatically in the 1970s.
All Farm Products
The volume of grain exports tripled. income fluctuations will come from international Economic Adviseprs.me ad C l of political considerations. The January, 1980, decision to ban the sale of certain agricultural products to the USSR had little to do with economic To accommodate the increase in farm exports, policy. Rather, it was a foreign policy action the area devoted to the production of crops for thought necessary because of the Soviet invasion export has nearly doubled. At times, transport of Afghanistan. systems and grain storage facilities have been
The growing variability in prices and farm inpushed nearly to their physical limits. However, come that will come with increasing exports in export expansion remains the most popular soluthis uncertain economic and political environtion to continued farm economic prosperity. ment will almost certainly give rise to farmers' No doubt, exports have contributed to the imdemands for public "protection." Doubters can proved financial position of (and outlook for) look to the Agricultural Trade Suspension Adfarmers. But, when coupled with the disappearjustment Act of 1980 for supporting evidence. ance of large government-held grain stocks and the sustained nearly full use of the cropland base, Energy Security. The second major area of pothe increase has also exposed U.S. farmers and tential policy crisis for agriculture derives from a consumers to an unaccustomed degree of comconcern with energy security. The doubling of oil modity price instability, enough to make it a polprices in 1979 convinced almost everyone that icy problem (Figure 1) . Part of this instability has rising energy prices are not a transient problem. been the result of unpredictable world weather Yet as with grain, the needed adjustments not conditions, yet much of it results from policyonly derive from the prospect of higher and more our own and that of our trading partners.
variable prices, but also, at times, from supply Many nations insulate their economies from disruptions that have little relationship to market extreme fluctuations in commodity prices (Hathconditions. away). Some, like the European Community,
The effects of the evolving energy situation on achieve price stability as a by-product of policies food and agriculture are not yet fully understood. that keep domestic prices above world equilibOn the one hand, higher relative energy prices rium levels. Others, like Canada and Australia, increase production costs. They also put more use state trading agencies to help stabilize pressure on substitutes for energy inputs, primarprices-quantitative restrictions on exports are ily land and water. But energy use is only part of routinely imposed when domestic price stability the picture. Agriculture is now looked to for inis threatened. Also, an increasing proportion of creases in output that will facilitate the substituthe total grain exported is going to centrally tion of renewable resources for products previplanned and developing countries that do not ously made from oil.
The benefits from programs that diversify our FIGURE 2. Relative Food Prices, U.S. energy sources are doubtless significant, but, RATIOV much like expenditures on national defense, are SEASONALLY ADJUSTED nearly impossible to quantify. Moreover, if indeed we have the "moral equivalent of war," the usual economic feasibility studies become largely\ A irrelevant.
However, the accountable costs of such programs are not trivial. For example, current gaso-10 o hol initiatives imply the need for about 370 million bushels and a 5-percent incremental increase in the area planted to corn by the end of 1982. The ethanol produced would replace about 1947 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 60,000 barrels of oil per day-about 1 percent of ' Ratio of implicit price deflator for food to implicit price current oil imports. The cost of producing ethadeflator for all personal consumption expenditures.
nol and the higher corn price, even when offset Source: Department of Commerce. by the value of by-product feeds and an increase in feedgrain export earnings, imply that the nation will pay nearly twice the present world price ent return of surpluses in 1976-77 helped support for each barrel of foreign oil displaced. 2 And with this notion. Nevertheless, food prices remained the incentives already authorized, the grain rehigh relative to other prices, and there is little quired for gasohol could more than double by evidence to suggest otherwise for the 1980s.
1985.
If such conditions do evolve, as now seems At the same time, periodically high sugar likely, consumers will be pressing for policy prices and the Southern Hemisphere's expanding changes that minimize the welfare loss; and it use of sugarcane for ethanol have combined to will not matter which political party is in power. increase the U.S. demand for corn as a sweetEvery action, whether by government or the ener. The amount of corn used to produce sweetprivate sector, that is even accused of putting eners has increased more than 60 percent in five upward pressure on food prices will be investiyears (USDA Sugar and Sweetener Report).
gated. Tobacco, rice, peanut, and extra-longCorn sweeteners could consume 700 million staple cotton programs that, to varying degrees, bushels of corn by 1985. Such an increase would still fix land use patterns by acreage allotments free some of the 1.2 million acres now devoted to will be scrutinized. Fruit and vegetable marketsugar beet production, but the pressure for preing orders that sometimes restrict output or mium Corn Belt cropland would intensify.
otherwise control marketings to enhance prices Rising energy prices are also increasing the will also be challenged. The challenge will extend demand for natural fibers, primarily cotton. As to the restrictive trade policies that protect those energy-based synthetic fibers were developed, higher prices. There will be policy pressure to much of the 40 million acres once planted to cotremove the economic penalties now imposed by ton became available for other crops, primarily regulation on the use of technologies that would soybeans. But since 1975, cotton acreage has inraise productivity in the food system. Grades and creased steadily. While a significant increase bestandards that now discourage the production yond the current 14 million-acre level is unlikely, and processing of foods that are more efficient cotton will not yield acreage to other uses withusers of increasingly scarce resources are also out significant changes in relative prices.
likely to be questioned. While debates on such issues will be controversial, they will nonetheless Food Price Stability. A third area of potential become more numerous as the costs of past polipolicy conflict-food price stability-derives cies become increasingly obvious. The debates partly from the other two. The political visibility may begin in earnest during 1981. of food inflation, when coupled with the prospect I am not persuaded by those who say such for rising and more volatile commodity prices alchanges will not occur. History teaches that ready discussed, could well make it the single while regulatory structures tend to slow resource most important factor in shaping the policy adjustments, they do not stop them. The ecoagenda for food and agriculture in the 1980s. nomic pressures to make the changes I have The evidence already suggests that the 25-year mentioned exist already; it is just a question of real decline in food prices had ended by the early time. Besides, it is likely that the policy pressure 1970s (Figure 2 ). When food prices soared in to change agricultural programs will come in-1973, many economists saw it as a temporary creasingly from broader-based proposals to deal deviation from the longer-term trend. The apparwith the nation's macroeconomic performance.
SOME SPECIFIC PROGRAM ISSUES
costs of avoiding the macroeconomic side effects of extreme price shocks. The policy areas just discussed, when coupled Government policy can alter the outcome of with the crisis-oriented policy process, lead to the storage decision by changing the expected the identification of three areas for potential proselling price, reducing the storage cost, or reducgrammatic change during the next several years.
ing the relative rate of return on the investment Each involves competing national goals and/or of funds from sales at the current price. Reaching the relatively visible expenditure of federal tax agreement on whether or how government dollars. In each case, decisions are needed in should influence the grain storage decision is ex-1981 because existing statutory authority extremely difficult. However, there is general pires.
agreement that public programs should utilize market forces to the extent possible. 1. The relationship between Government-
The farmer-owned reserve program represents supported commodity reserves and our apa pragmatic solution to the grain storage dilemma parent unqualified policy of continued ex- (Burnstein) . It has been a popular, flexible, and port expansion ("more is better") is likely reasonably efficient stock management tool. The to be reviewed over the next several years. nonrecoverable taxpayer costs have been payThat debate could begin this year.
ments for storage and interest costs on Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans extended to 2. There is considerably less uncertainty farmers using the reserve. Sales from the reabout the likelihood of a dairy policy deserve, above the minimum "release" price, have bate. The price support and marketing been subject to the same market forces that order programs have obvious and direct rewould prevail if the stocks were privately filationships to food price inflation and budnanced. get costs, which make them visible and thus Nevertheless, there are some difficult, unanripe for debate. swered questions, commodity coverage, size, and operational procedures being the most im-3. The third area, which has already been portant. targeted by both the Secretary of AgriculAt present, the program is available only to ture and the Chairman of the Senate Agproducers of wheat, rice, and feedgrains. Rericulture Committee, is food assistance.
serves have also been suggested for other imporHere the issue is fundamentally that of budtant export commodities, cotton and soybeans, get cost.
for example (Motes) . Such reserves might help to build export markets over time, and they would Grain Reserves and Export Policy probably help to stabilize prices. But the macroeffects of price variability in these markets are As mentioned, increased exports continue to less obvious than with feedgrains, and it is still be the most popular solution for price and innot entirely clear how much government-supcome problems in agriculture. It is considered to ported reserves for these commodities would add be the "free market" solution. But export marto privately financed stocks. kets are not free markets, and, assuming that Optimal reserve size is also a difficult and still they are, risks exposing the food and farm sector unanswered question. There is a level of reserves to unnecessary, destabilizing variability in prices that will provide cost-effective price stabilization and income. Also the nation, in time, will have to in most situations, but the exact level appropriate deal with the impending depletion of natural refor any one year changes with supply and desources now being exaggerated by its policy of mand conditions. And short-run competing maximizing exports (Batie and Healy). These are pressures, partly related to the existence of mulboth farm and food concerns.
tiple program goals, complicate attempts to settle on a specific target quantity.
Commodity Reserves. Unless attitudes about
Other questions pertain to the operation of the embargoes change dramatically, reserve stocks reserve program. Most debates in this area will seem the only realistic source of protection continue to focus on when and how stocks are against the inflationary price rises that otherwise released for sale and on the types of incentives occur during periods of short supply. They also made available to encourage use of the program. cushion price declines in temporary periods of
In general, the answers to all these questions will overproduction.
depend on whether the reserve program is perIf information and credit markets were perfect ceived primarily as a tool to raise prices and inand if there were no macroeconomic (i.e., "pubcrease farm income or to cushion the sector lic good") side effects, private markets could be against price shocks. relied on to hold the needed stocks. But such markets are not perfect. Nor is it reasonable to
The Reduced Need for Subsidies. The improvexpect that private investors will assume the ing economic health of the nation's farmers re-duces the need for programs that subsidize their greater output; consumers have benefitted from income. The growing importance of exports inlower food prices. Now that exports account for creases the likelihood that the benefits of certain a large, and growing, share of farm income, it is farm subsidy programs will accrue to our export less evident that such subsidies are desirable customers. Taken together, these observations public policy. suggest, first, that grain sold from the reserve To avoid unintended transfers of uncompenshould be priced high enough to cover not only sated national wealth to our export customers, the costs of grain productions, but also, if possithe resources committed to agriculture will need ble, program costs; and, second, that the incenproper pricing. For example, this means that our tives to place grain in reserve should be no greatunderground water resources, once thought to be er than necessary to meet the domestic price virtually unlimited, should probably be priced to stabilization objective. Present policy, including reflect their limited availability (U.S. Governadministrative practices and legal authority, does ment Accounting Office). It also means that the not serve either of these objectives as well as it price of grain should reflect the full costs of might.
transporting it to export terminals. Within this For example, current law requires the waiver context, taxpayer subsidies for grain transport of interest normally paid by farmers on CCC systems become more questionable. loans and the taxpayer payment of grain storage.
Where all of this is likely to take us in 1981 is Consequently, prices for grain sold from the reunclear. The positions of various interest groups serve do not now have to reflect carrying costs.
are still quite far apart. The adverse macroecoIf the grain is sold at a lower price than is renomic (and political) consequences of the rising quired to cover carrying costs, export customers and more volatile food prices often associated benefit disproportionately. In part they benefit with increasing exports have generated proposals because American taxpayers subsidize the storfor state trading. The growing depletion of natuage of grain, and they also benefit because lower ral resources has revived talk of export taxes. average prices imply the need for larger reserves.
Such proposals are not likely to go far: mainly However, if grain from the reserve is sold at a they conflict with a deep-seated economic phiprice that covers both production and program losophy. However, proposals to eliminate subcosts (which is quite likely, given the inelastic sidies for input use (including transportation) or nature of the demand), farmers receive a windfall product sales are not so constrained. Farmers that may be larger than necessary to reach the would oppose such changes, but from a national price stabilization objective, policy perspective, they seem far superior to the However, requiring farmers to pay storage alternatives. And they are consistent with the costs and full interest on CCC loans would probgrowing notion that prices should be relied on ably result in reserves too small to gain the price more, and government less, for resource allocastabilization objective. But if imperfect agricultion. tural credit markets are the most serious impediment to producer grain storage, the higher CCC Dairy Policy loans for grain entering the reserve might be sufficient to attract the desired stocks in most years.
Dairy policy is the most likely candidate for The most efficient way to operate the program contentious farm policy debate in 1981. The imwould be to require farmers to bid for the right to mediate problem areas are the level of, and place grain into reserve. Under such a scheme, method for determining, price support, as well as farmers offering to store a specific quantity of the unresolved federal order policy issues. In grain at the lowest "price" (i.e., taxpayer subfact, if program actions are consistent with the sidy) would be granted authorized entry.
announced emphasis on deregulation, those isThe flexibility granted by the Agricultural Act sues may get considerable attention from the new of 1980, which authorizes special (higher) loans administration. for grain entering the reserve, might be used to implement such a plan. Nevertheless, legislative
Price Support Program. Milk remains the only changes would be needed to require the farmer to major commodity whose price is supported as a pay for storage and interest. specified percentage of parity. While basic statuIn addition to grain reserves, government tory authority provides flexibility in setting the policies have subsidized the use of key agriculsupport price between 75 and 90 percent of partural inputs. Cost sharing programs for soil conity, the 1977 Act made 80 percent the minimum servation, land development, improved soil ferand required a semiannual adjustment. That autility, pest control, and prevention of plant and thority was extended in 1979 for two more years. animal diseases have been commonplace. Water
There is widespread, albeit not unanimous, projects and natural disaster protection programs agreement that the 1977 Act removed "too have reduced to a considerable degree the risks much" administrative flexibility and that the of farming in the South and West. Such programs support price has been "too high" since then. have reduced production costs and encouraged
The removal of a near-record 6.5 percent of the total milk production during 1979-1980 at a net one that will be resisted by dairy farmers (and CCC cost of about $1.0 billion is frequently used perhaps the administration for budgetary reaas evidence to support the claim (USDA Dairy sons), would be to revert to basic statutory auSituation). thority (i.e., 75 to 90 percent of parity). Such a Frankly, and unfortunately, that so-called "solution" will be only temporary. Until the milk "evidence" misses the point. There have been price support is rationalized in a context consistimes during the past decade when support price tent with contemporary agricultural policy and was low relative to the cost of producing milk.
tied to movements in the cost of producing milk, The real economic policy problem is that the with appropriate adjustments for changes in dedairy price support decision is now tied to mand, this issue will not disappear. movements in a price-based index that has little relation either to the cost of producing milk or its
Marketing Orders for Milk. The current federal demand. As an example, feed costs, which acorder system evolved from the economic condicount for about half the cost of producing milk, tions that prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s, when have only a 12 percent weight in the parity index.
there were thousands of independent farmers This was not a serious problem when grain selling milk to independent processing plants. prices were stabilized by huge governmentSince independent producers could not regulate owned surpluses, but when the price of grain is the aggregate flow of product to the market on allowed to fluctuate, a milk support price adany given day, processors were able to offer the justment based on parity will frequently run marginal value for all milk delivered. In shortcounter to changed cost conditions for dairy supply seasons, the marginal value was high in farmers. When grain prices increase more than relation to production costs, while at other times other prices, the parity adjustment will not acit was low. commodate the increase in milk production Market orders were designed to stabilize the costs; when grain prices increase less than other fluid milk price. Minimum prices, at least in theprices, the parity adjustment overstates the cost ory, were established as the prices processors increase. The evidence is fairly convincing that would have to pay if they obtained fluid milk variability in milk production was increased in from the upper Midwest and transported it to the 1970s because the price support decision was their local markets, that is, an alternative supply tied rigidly to changes in the parity index (Babb price. This regulatory structure remains intact and Boynton). That result seems to run counter today. to the purpose of the statute.
Almost without exception, the conditions that The conceptual role of the milk price support is gave rise to this regulatory structure no longer also difficult to articulate, at least within the conexist (Fallert) . Dairy cooperatives handle more text of contemporary agricultural policy. For than 80 percent of the Grade A milk and satisfy several years, loan prices for the major grains 67 percent of fluid milk handlers' needs. The minhave been thought of as an economic safety net, imum federal order prices are badly out of aligna price below which long-run productive capacity ment with the theoretical alternative supply would not be sustained. Direct payments have price, and "over-order premiums" are now rebeen used since the 1960s to compensate for the quired in many markets to obtain needed income loss that farmers frequently associate supplies of fresh milk. Most important, the techwith the "low" loan price policy.
nology now exists to make raw milk less perishThat "safety net" concept hardly has meaning able and less costly to transport, thus, less exfor the current dairy program. In only two years pensive for consumers. since 1948 (1973 and 1974) has the price paid to Nevertheless, the pricing system still preproducers of manufactured milk exceeded 110 sumes the need for fresh raw milk in all markets percent of the support price (Novakovic) . In only at all times. Fluid products made commercially five years has it exceeded 105 percent of the supfrom manufactured milk ingredients carry an port price. For all practical purposes, the support economic penalty. Technologies that would reprice is the milk price, move part of the water from raw milk prior to As with reserves and export policy, it is not transport and resale as a fluid product are also clear just how the milk price support question prohibited, either explicitly or by economic penwill be resolved in 1981. The recent relative inalty. crease in feed costs will benefit dairy farmers in
The availability of such technologies and the the debate; but the focus on broader national rising relative costs of transportation make it economic issues, including the size of the budget, likely that current federal order regulations will will force some change. A 1981 compromise that come under increased policy pressure. In part, retains the reliance on parity yet allows substanthis is because such rules penalize consumers by tially more flexibility in establishing the support limiting access to lower cost alternatives to fresh price is a strong possibility. The semiannual admilk; but, eventually, producers will also see justment is almost certain to be eliminated.
these policies as limiting their potential for ecoThe "easiest" solution for the Congress, but nomic gains.
The present rigid regulatory structure is also most direct way to reduce overall program out of step with the times. Airlines, railroads, costs are probably the least equitable: the financial institutions, and energy pricing have all benefit level is already low relative to the been "deregulated." In an era when increased costs of feeding a family. The average food reliance on prices as allocators is being sought, it stamp family gets about 39 cents per meal. is not likely that milk marketing orders will sur-USDA estimates that a moderate income vive in their present form, at least not without a household spends about $1 per meal to feed formal debate. a family of 4 (Longen and Stucker). Where this debate will lead (or just when it will take place) is not easy to predict. At some point, 3. Participation and costs are importantly inthe new administration will have to make a decifluenced by food price inflation and unemsion on the year-old Community Nutrition Instiployment (Longen and Stucker) . Even if tute's reconstituted milk petition.
participation had remained unchanged from The importance of that decision should not be its 1977 level of 17 million, fiscal 1980 costs minimized. It could clarify whether it is indeed would have exceeded the spending cap by national policy to ensure the continued availabilnearly $1 billion because of higher food ity of fresh milk as the only commercial fluid prices. Also, USDA estimates that each 1 dairy product, regardless of any changes in techpercent increase in unemployment adds nology or in consumer preferences.
from 750,000 to 1 million people to the program: the 1980 increase in unemployment Domestic Food Assistance added about 1.5 million persons to the program. Food stamps have been the primary method of domestic food assistance for about a decade None of this is meant to imply that important (Boehm, Nelson, and Longen) . The only real solution to the spending probeliminating the purchase requirement. The lem, which is also politically viable, is to reduce spending ceilings were raised last year-to $9.49 food price inflation and lower the unemployment billion for 1980 and $9.74 billion for 1981. The rate. That conclusion will be difficult to accept in 1981 cap will be inadequate to cover program most quarters today, yet it is the only conclusion costs at current benefit levels. The new administhat is consistent with available evidence. tration will be faced with a tough decision on food stamp spending very early in its first year. The difficulty associated with meaningful food IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHERN stamp reform is highlighted by the following: AGRICULTURE 1. Proposals to cut the pool of eligible particiThe growing worldwide demand for food and pants tend to be very expensive politfiber should have important spillover effects for ically-large numbers of persons must be southern farmers. Cotton, soybeans, poultry, removed before significant dollars are rice, feedgrain, and perhaps even peanut producsaved (USDA, Characteristics of Food ers should experience gains from the relative Stamp Households: February 1978). Nearly demand shifts now expected for the 1980s. But to 90 percent of the 8 million households now facilitate those shifts in resource use, it is likely receiving food stamps have gross annual that the rigid regulatory structures for some incomes below the poverty line. More than commodities historically associated with southhalf have gross incomes of $3600 or less; ern agriculture will need to change, and those three-fourths have incomes below $4800. changes undoubtedly will be controversial. The participant households with incomes
In particular, the growing pressures on the above the poverty line tend to be elderly or cropland base make it likely that the existing working poor. commodity programs for peanuts, tobacco, rice and ELS cotton will not be retained in their pres-2. Across the board benefit cuts, while the ent form much longer. These programs probably will be extended without much change in the will be extremely important to southern agricul-1981 farm bill. Primarily, I believe, that will hapture. And the pressures for change in these areas, pen because of the changes stemming from the as with the commodity programs, seem to be 1980 elections (a new secretary of agriculture, running counter to the narrow special interests of and new chairmen of the Senate and House Agproducers in the region. riculture Committees). But the economic forces that are building are unmistakable.
CONCLUDING REMARKS These same pressures are also likely to generate proposals for change in other production conIt is critical to keep agricultural policy in pertrol methods-even those for the major grains.
spective. While there are still frequent debates The potential for variability that now exists in about the wisdom of past actions, history reannual production and exports makes it likely minds us that the performance of the sector, parthat temporary production controls for such ticularly in this century, has been good. Farmers commodities may again be needed. It will be difhave benefited less from past programs than is ficult for farmers or the Congress to focus on that generally believed; consumers (and taxpayers) fact in a year following a major drought. In this have benefited more than is generally admitted. regard, it is significant that southern farmers And partisan politics has not been very imporwere able to convince Congress to withdraw tant. In the main, policy changes have responded funding for operation of the Normal Crop Acreto changing economic pressures. Today, primarage (NCA) for 1981 even with strong opposition ily because it is necessary for improved ecofrom USDA. Just how farmers would respond to nomic efficiency, more importance is being proposals that would eliminate set-aside or diplaced on the allocative functions that can be version authority is still uncertain, performed by prices; there is significantly less The potential for change in dairy policy is also government interference with producers' deciimportant to southern agriculture. The federal sion making than was the case a decade ago. order program has doubtlessly enhanced the inAgricultural policy changes in the future will comes of southern dairy farmers. After all, this build on this tradition. More attention will be has traditionally been afluid milk market. But given to programs that stabilize commodity southern dairy farmers also have an important prices and farm income. Programs that control economic stake in continuation of the price supproduction and artificially raise prices will be port program.
changed. Such programs will come into increasFarmers in the South will also be affected by ing conflict with broader national economic poldecisions on grain reserve and export policy. icy objectives and with producers' own ecoSouthern agriculture is a large user of feedgrain, nomic self-interest. and much of it is imported from outside the reFor agriculture, as for the rest of the economy, gion. Unless policy actions to moderate grain the broadest of all policy challenges will be to price volatility are extended, the livestock sector find new and more flexible ways to use resources in the region faces the prospect of conditions efficiently, while at the same time protecting more volatile than during the 1970s.
against the potentially destabilizing effects of exPerhaps the most important issues are those treme price volatility. There are some difficult being raised regarding the subsidization of input policy choices ahead, but that is where food and use. Water, land use, and transportation policy agricultural policy is headed in the 1980s.
